State v. Renteria Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 45022 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-13-2017
State v. Renteria Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
45022
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Renteria Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45022" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6871.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6871
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MARCOS A. RENTERIA, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) Docket Nos. 45022-2017 
) Canyon County No. CR-2016-9811-C 
) 
) Docket No. 45023-2017 







APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
******************************** 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon 
******************************** 
Honorable Judge Southworth 
District Judge, presiding 
******************************** 
Deena Tvinnereim 
Ramirez Smith & Tvinnereim 
1000 W. Sanetta Street 
Nampa, Idaho 83651 
Phone:208-461-1883 
Fax: 208-461-1680 
Attorney for Appellant 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General, State of Idaho 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720 
Phone: 208-334-2400 
Fax: 208-854-8071 
Attorney for the Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... ... ........................ .. ....... .. .. ................................................................... i 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ............................................. .. .. .......... ... ... ........... .. ... .. ii 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW ..... ..... ............ ......... .. ..... ..................... .................................................. 1 
ARGUMENT .... .... ..... ....... .. ... ......... .... ...... ..... ............ ... ........ ........ ..... ... ...................... ..... .. .............. 1 
A. Sproat lmpermissibly Extended the Traffic Stop in Violation of Mr. Renteria's 
Fourth Amendment Rights ................................................................... 1 
1. Sproat immediately abandoned the initial purpose of the traffic stop and 
began investigating Mr. Renteria for drugs ... ............ .......... ... ......... 2 
2. Upon abandoning the original purpose of the stop, Sproat requested a drug-
detection dog before calling in Mr. Renteria's information ............ ...... 5 
3. Sproat's "brief'' discussion with the canine officer, while waiting for 
dispatch to respond, does not remedy the underlying deviation ......... ..... 6 
CONCLUSION ........... ... ............. ... ....... ..... .. ....... .. ..... .. ... ................................................................. 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................... .............................................................. 9 
1 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979) ............................................................... l 
Rodriguezv. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015) ............................................................... passim 
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661,664,809 P.2d 522,525 (Ct. App. 1991) ....................................... 1 
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 607,389 P.3d 150 (2016) .............................................................. passim 
State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,613, 798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct. App. 1990) ........................................ 3 
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439,362 P.3d 514 (2015) ..................................................................... l, 4 
State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919,924,367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016) ......... ....... ..... ................ .4 
I J- I· .I 
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) .................................................... l 
State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 600, 38 P.3d 633,638 (2001) ............................................... .4 
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984, 88 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2003) ................................... 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const. amend. IV ........... ............ ....... ......... ............. ................................ ...... ..... .... ..... ... .. .. ...... 1 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code§ 49-808 ................................................................... .................. ...... .................. .......... 3 
11 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard." State 
v. Linze, 161 Idaho 607, 607, 389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 
207, 207 P .3d 182, 183 (2009). This Court will "accept the trial court's finding of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous." Id. However, the Court "may freely review the trial court's application of 
constitutional principles in light of the facts found." Id. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Sproat Impermissibly Extended the Traffic Stop in Violation of Mr. Renteria's 
Fourth Amendment Rights. 
This Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Renteria's motion to suppress, 
pursuant to Rodriguez v. United States and State v. Linze, based on the three de minimis deviations 
that unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop conducted by law enforcement constitutes a 
seizure of the vehicle's occupants, and thus, the Fourth Amendment applies. Linze, 161 Idaho at 
608, 389 P.3d at 153 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979)). The 
seizure is valid under Fourth Amendment principles so long as the officer initiated the stop based 
on reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 
153 (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)). 
"The suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective information available to the 
officer when he decided to make the stop, and cannot be bolstered by evidence gathered following 
the stop." State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 443, 362 P.3d 514, 518 (2015) (quoting State v. Emory, 
119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct. App. 1991)). Further, the seizure cannot last longer 
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than necessary to address the infraction (the purpose of the stop). Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. 
The seizure becomes unreasonable (i.e., unconstitutional) when the seizing officer deviates from 
the tasks related to the traffic infraction at any time before or after completion of those tasks. Linze, 
161 Idaho at 609,389 P.3d at 154. The deviation itself constitutes anew seizure with a new purpose 
and thus requires new reasonable suspicion to justify the new seizure. See id ("[t]new seizure 
cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of the original seizure."). 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez held that absent reasonable suspicion, a dog sniff 
that adds time to the stop unlawfully prolongs its initial purpose and violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 1616. In Linze, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the rule articulated in 
Rodriguez is "both broad and inflexible." Linze; 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 153. "It applies to 
all extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered de minimis." Id. 
When the deviation occurs is irrelevant, the only important fact is that the officer deviated from 
the original purpose. Id. 
1. Sproat immediately abandoned the initial purpose of the traffic stop and 
began investigating Mr. Renteria for drugs. 
This Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Renteria because Sproat's 
questioning about drugs and weapons, unrelated to the purpose of the stop, unlawfully prolonged 
the initial purpose of the stop and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Although 
questions about drugs and weapons are a routine part of a traffic stop, additional questioning 
without new reasonable suspicion must be considered a de mini mis deviation. See Linze, 161 Idaho 
at 608,389 P.3d at 153. Thus, absent circumstances justifying additional questioning about drugs 
and weapons, the tasks related to initiating the canine search would inevitably lengthen the time 
needed to complete the original purpose of the initial seizure. See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1613. 
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Here, Sproat's initial questioning of Mr. Renteria, without articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and which ultimately induced the canine search, 
constitutes the first de minimis deviation. The district court, however, declined to rule on whether 
reasonable suspicion existed for the deviations as the court reasoned the issue was moot since, in 
its opinion, there were no extensions and thus, no reasonable suspicion needed. To support the 
district court's decision, Respondent correctly points out that an officer may ask questions about 
drugs and weapons, regardless of whether that was the purpose of the initial stop. However, this 
questioning is not without limits. Sproat continued questioning Mr. Renteria about drugs and 
weapons even after he denied the presence of either. 
Like in Linze; any additional questioning that Sproat-subjected, Mr. Renteria to -constituted · 
the initiation of a new purpose, which required new reasonable suspicion. Further, and similar to 
Linze, "multi-tasking" by asking such questions (while Mr. Renteria tried to find his proof of 
insurance) should not earn Sproat bonus time to ask unrelated questions just because the 
questioning may or may not have delayed the traffic investigation. (Resp't Br., pg. 9 (emphasis in 
original)). Conversely, Respondent, citing to State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 984, 88 P.3d 1220, 
1224 (Ct. App. 2003) and State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,613, 798 P.2d 453,458 (Ct. App. 1990), 
argues that Sproat did not abandon the traffic investigation because his initial contact with Mr. 
Renteria materialized suspicious circumstances that justified asking questions unrelated to Mr. 
Renteria's violation of LC. § 49-808. 
In other words, during the short period of time ( approximately one minute) after Sproat 
asked for Mr. Renteria's identification, registration, and destination, his suspicion of criminality 
had evolved beyond the initial purpose of the stop. However, the totality of the circumstances 
known to Sproat at that moment proves no legitimate reasons existed to question Mr. Renteria 
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about drugs and weapons or that would warrant further investigation. Sproat did not have any 
safety concerns (Mosley was standing near him watching the encounter, and Mr. Renteria was 
cooperative). Cf Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (attending to safety concerns relates to the 
reasonable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context). Further, he did not see any drugs 
in plain view or smell an odor of drugs. Cf State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 600, 38 P.3d 633, 
63 8 (2001) (the officer noticed an odor of burnt marijuana coming through the open window as 
the driver searched for his registration and insurance during the traffic stop). 
Sproat later testified that he suspected Mr. Renteria of drug activity for four reasons. First, 
Mr. Renteria had made a quick lane change without signaling for the required five (5) seconds. Cf 
Neal, 159 Idaho at 443,362 P.3d at 518 {moving onto the fog line-on two instances does not mean 
the driver is drunk). Second, Mr. Renteria had shaky hands. Cf State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919,924, 
367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App. 2016) (stating that a nervous demeanor is of limited significance 
in establishing reasonable suspicion because people commonly exhibit signs of nervousness when 
confronted with police regardless of criminal activity). Third, the front passenger was wearing 
glasses while looking straight ahead. Fourth, Mr. Renteria driving from Arizona and to 
Washington. Lastly, Mr. Renteria had the picture of the patron saint Jesus Malverde in his wallet. 
None of these reasons, whether standing alone or together, create reasonable suspicion to justify 
calling a K-9 unit. 
None of these reasons, whether standing alone or together, create reasonable suspicion to 
justify calling a K-9 unit. In conclusion, the Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. 
Renteria's motion to suppress because Sproat required new reasonable suspicion to continue 
questioning Mr. Renteria about drugs and weapons after he denied the presence of either. Thus, 
the district court declining to rule on whether reasonable suspicion existed renders this additional 
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questioning a deviation from the original purpose and unlawful extension of the stop, in violation 
of Mr. Renteria's rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
2. Upon abandoning the original purpose of the stop, Sproat requested a drug-
detection dog before calling in Mr. Renteria 's information. 
This Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Renteria's motion to suppress 
based on the fact that Sproat requested a canine before calling dispatch to run Mr. Renteria's 
information, a de minimis deviation that unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights. In Linze, the pertinent question concerned whether or not the seizure 
remained reasonable under the Fourth Amendment once the officer abandoned the purpose of the 
seizure in order to aid in a search for contraband. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 153. 
Although an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, 
a canine search is not part of a "routine" traffic stop. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. 
Here, the second de minimis deviation occurred when Sproat called the canine unit before 
calling dispatch to run Mr. Renteria's license and information. Further, Sproat never addressed the 
infraction with Mr. Renteria again after initially asking for his driver's license, registration, and 
destination. This also shows that Sproat abandoned the intial purpose of the stop. In contrast, 
Respondent argues that Sproat did not abandon his traffic investigation because he contacted 
dispatch with the birthdates and names of Mr. Renteria and his passenger, to run a records check, 
as soon as he returned to his patrol vehicle. (Resp't Br., pg. 8). According to the Respondent, this 
proves that Sproat remained diligent in pursuing the reasons for initiating the traffic stop. Sproat's 
actions after requesting the canine unit, however, do not "cure" the de minimis deviation. 
Like in Rodriguez, the only concern is that Sproat deviated from the original purpose of 
the stop at all. Additionally, Respondent asserts that by requesting a drug-detection dog while 
walking back to the patrol car, Sproat did not prolong his traffic investigation. (Resp't Br., pg. 9 
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(emphasis in original)). However, similar to Linze, "multi-tasking" should not earn Sproat bonus 
time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. Id. Regardless of the timing aspect of the 
deviation, Sproat called in the canine unit before calling in Mr. Renteria' s information. Because 
the de minimis deviation occurred, Sproat was required to have new reasonable suspicion to pursue 
the new purpose of furthering the drug investigation. In conclusion, Sproat calling in the canine 
before calling dispatch to run Mr. Renteria's information constitutes an abandonment of the initial 
purpose of the stop and a de minimis deviation which, because it occurred, violates his fourth 
amendment rights. 
3. Sproat's "brief'' discussion with the canine officer, while waiting for 
dispatch to respond, does not remedy the underlying deviation. 
This Court should reverse the district court's denial of Mr. Renteria's motion to suppress 
because Sproat's discussion with the canine officer, no matter the timing aspect, proves that he 
aided and advanced the unrelated drug investigation, which constitutes a de minimis deviation and 
violates Mr. Renteria's rights under the Fourth Amendment. A de minimis deviation, no matter the 
timing aspect, does not change the fact that it occurred to begin with. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1609. 
A canine search itself, aimed at detecting evidence of criminal wrongdoing, is considered a 
deviation and requires new reasonable suspicion. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154. Thus, 
conducting a drug sniff that adds time to the stop, no matter how brief, is an unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1609; see also Linze, 161 Idaho at 608,389 P.3d 
at 153 (holding that the seizure becomes unreasonable once the officer abandons the initial purpose 
in order to aid in a search for contraband). 
Here, the third de minimis deviation occurred when Sproat spoke with the canine officer 
while waiting for dispatch to respond to his records check request. Respondent argues that because 
Sproat's discussion was brief, no unreasonable extension of the traffic stop occurred. (Resp't Br., 
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pg. 9). However, this contention directly conflicts with Linze and Rodriguez. The court in 
Rodriguez allowed for dog sniffs, but only when they do not add time to the stop. Linze also 
supports canine searches, however, it held that conducting the traffic-related tasks expeditiously 
does not grant the seizing officer bonus time to pursue unrelated criminal investigation. Thus, it 
follows that the Respondent's argument fails in that this waiting or idle time, does not grant the 
police unlimited power to go on a fishing expedition or pursue an unrelated criminal investigation. 
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to deny Mr. Renteria's motion 
to suppress because, pursuant to Linze and Rodriguez, the timing of Sproat' s third deviation does 
not matter or allow him to unlawfully prolong the purpose of the initial stop and violates Mr. 
Renteria's Fourth Amendment rights. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Mr. Renteria respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
denial of his motion to suppress based on the three de minim is devations that, with the absence of 
a ruling on the reasonable suspicion issue, unlawfully prolonged the purpose of the initial traffic 
stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Renteria is not disputing the validity of the initial 
stop or his seizure in order for Sproat to conduct the routine tasks related to the traffic infraction. 
Rather, the full-blown drug investigation that began almost immediately after Sproat pulled him 
over, when the original purpose of the traffic stop concerned his traffic violation, Sproat requesting 
the K-9 unit before calling in Mr. Renteria's information, and ceasing to diligently pursue the 
purpose of the stop to discuss with the canine officer his reasons for believing Mr. Renteria was 
involved in drug activity. 
What the Respondent and district court believe is that everything that occurred to Mr. 
Renteria, from the initiation of the traffic stop to its end, constitutes as "routine" and 
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constitutionally acceptable under Fourth Amendment principles. Further, Sproat's actions cannot 
constitutionally be called "multi-tasking," when in accordance with Rodriguez and Linze, such 
completion of all traffic-related tasks does not earn the police bonus time to pursue unrelated 
criminal investigations. For the reasons stated herein, Mr. Renteria respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the decision of the district court denying the motion to suppress and remand this 
case for further proceeding~istent with the Court's opinion. 
DATED this ~ ay of October, 2017. 
RAMIREZ-SMITH & TVINNEREIM 
By .. 
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